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continued on page 74
Papa Abel Remembers — The Tale of A Band of 
Booksellers, Fascicle 19: Economic Realities
by Richard Abel  (Aged Independent Learner)  <reabel@q.com>
By 1974 the competitive environment had changed markedly — particularly in North America.  John Coutts’ firm in 
Canada, after he spun off from our firm, had not 
only garnered a significant fraction of the Cana-
dian scholarly book market but had established 
a U.S. presence first for the acquisition of books 
published in the U.S. and not co-published by 
Canadian publishers and, later, for the market-
ing of the firm’s services to academic libraries 
along the northeastern tier of states.  In a parallel 
development, several regional booksellers of 
scholarly books had emerged from among some 
local or specialist booksellers.  All of them began 
to offer some parts of our services — filling firm-
orders generated by libraries; standing orders for 
books in series, Approval Plans based upon LC 
card or MARC records, the supply of cataloging 
for books supplied, etc.  All had been patterned 
after the body of services we had developed. 
We well understood that the competition would 
imitate this integrated body of services, for we 
had widely and openly distributed the relevant 
explanatory literature to academic and research 
libraries across the continent and abroad.  But 
we were somewhat taken by surprise at the 
number of regional imitators that had sprung up. 
In addition, of course, we had to contend with 
the assorted regional university networks which 
had materialized around the country thanks to 
the largesse of various state capital grants and 
those of the CLR.
The consequence for the Argonauts was 
that we had to work harder at marketing our 
services — both in North America and abroad. 
The overseas demand for scholarly books was 
becoming, both in fact and in our planning 
terms, of increasing importance.  It had proved 
an increasingly profitable segment for the firm. 
This was not only because overseas libraries 
required increasing numbers of scholarly books 
published in the English language to compensate 
for the dearth of books acquired during the war; 
for the massive rebuilding effort demanded after 
the cessation of hostilities, and lastly due to 
the increasing dominance of English language 
scholarship.  They also were grateful for the 
rapidity of our air-transport system as well as the 
fact that we attached no mark-up over list prices 
as both the ossified system of book distribution 
overseas had imposed and required.
It will be recalled that the business plan 
worked out with the underwriting firm, which 
had agreed to take the firm public, called for 
making this stock offering in 1975.  This plan 
assumed that our sales volume and level of 
profitability were such as to price the shares 
at $10.  So, we were keenly aware of these 
newly-emerged competitors and the exigencies 
resulting therefrom.  We were maddeningly 
pressed by the need of resolving on schedule 
the financial stringencies under which we had 
labored from virtually the first days of the firm. 
Having our necks and spirits relieved by the 
removal of this financial albatross was keenly 
anticipated by nearly the entire staff.  So, we 
bent every effort to realizing the objectives of the 
financial projections — and were on track to that 
end despite the newly emerged competition.
But as the year evolved, the remarkable 
inflation, which had already persisted for a 
couple of years, became harder to deal with 
— particularly in connection with keeping our 
wage and salary programs intact.  But this dif-
ficulty soon proved of lesser significance than a 
couple of others which had cropped up.  The first 
of the latter were that the results of the research 
by Charles Marshall into our specific costs 
of doing business were beginning to come in. 
They were disquieting.  Even more disquieting 
was the observation by Keith Barker that our 
conventional accounting results were showing 
a decline in our profit margins.  He recruited 
Paul Sibley to help in uncovering the causes of 
this decline.  Within months the principal cause 
was discovered to be the fact that the ratio of the 
library-originated orders coming in had been 
progressively skewing to a growing number of 
orders for hard-to-obtain or no-discount titles or 
low-priced short discount books.  This finding 
could quickly be related back to the increas-
ingly frequent reports from the firm’s various 
domestic office managers that libraries that 
had switched part of their business to the newly 
emerged competition were clearly sending us 
all of their orders for hard-to-obtain or no-dis-
count or low-priced titles.  Meanwhile, Charles 
Marshal’s cost studies had revealed that short 
discount books bearing a list price of less than 
$20.00 would not support our costs in providing 
them.  Our firm was, in short, the default supplier 
of such books as the other booksellers returned, 
such library orders as “OP” or “indefinitely out 
of stock” or “not available through the trade” 
or other such dodges invented to maintain the 
competition’s margins.  This was, of course, a 
sensible thing for the libraries to do, for we were 
prepared, as we had always been, to provide a 
total service regardless of our margin.  So the 
librarians playing this strategy could feel good 
about cultivating assumed dealer competition 
and satisfying regional loyalties while obtaining 
all the profitless materials demanded by faculty 
and graduate students.
What was the answer to this cluster of related 
problems, which were weighing increasingly 
heavily upon our economic viability?  After 
some months of debate and the examination of 
a wide range of alternatives to the resolution 
of that conundrum, we settled on a radical ap-
proach to the solution to this knot of problems. 
We ultimately concluded that a cost-plus pricing 
schedule based upon the actual costs of handling 
various classes of books and attendant services 
best fit our circumstances and the interests of 
libraries whose budgets were being increasingly 
hard-pressed.  Thus, a title carrying a high list-
price and a trade discount would command a 
far greater discount from list-price than a low 
list-price title sold to us at a short discount.  By 
way of further example, a title in-series would 
be assigned a lesser discount if provided as a 
library-generated order for the same title — this 
to provide for the greater costs incurred in man-
aging and policing the standing order.  Yet one 
more example: a title supplied on the Approval 
Plan would carry a lesser markup than a library-
generated order, as the former was a mass-pro-
duced service while the latter required additional 
costs of shelving, picking, and the increased risk 
of becoming dead inventory stock.
five, only one was a computer manual while the 
others were surprising: Russian Origins of the 
First World War; Place, Writing, and Voice in 
Oral History; New Science of Religion: Explor-
ing Spirituality from the Outside In and Bottom 
Up; and Metaphor and the Historical Evolution 
of Conceptual Mapping.  The STLs covered all 
subjects across the board, including humanities 
(e.g., religion, history, language arts, political sci-
ence, and literary criticism), science, and social 
science (psychology).  The cost was $1300.
ebrary offers good statistics at their Website. 
It was interesting to see how many and what books 
were viewed, how many pages, and how many 
user sessions.  This again shows that our patrons 
were making use of the electronic content.
There are some complications.  We discov-
ered that the links to the contents may not work. 
Biz of Acq
from page 70
The invoices for STLs are in paper, so the Ac-
quisitions staff will have to design procedures to 
accommodate them.  The Acquisitions staff will 
also need to account for any titles purchased 
outside the ebrary/YBP system (standing orders, 
Amazon, etc.) to make sure duplicates are not 
received.
As more libraries experiment with PDA, 
hopefully more will publish about their experi-
ences.  The April 17, 2012 issue of the Chronicle 
of Higher Education has an article called “Is 
psychology about to come undone?”  All of the 
studies published in the 2008 issues of three psy-
chology journals (Psychological Science; Journal 
of Personality and Social Science: Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition) will be reproduced to check the 
validity.  If psychologists can check the results of 
their peers, in that spirit, we hope other libraries 
will consider comparing their PDA results.  This 
version of “PDA” is still a pilot for us, but the 
initial results are intriguing.  
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We had a second objective in mind in opt-
ing for a cost-plus system.  While it would be 
marginally more complex to install and operate, 
it had the enormous virtue of being a much more 
transparent system and could give any half-way 
savvy acquisition librarian the means to identify 
those dealers playing the traditional games of 
diddling discounts — some almost monthly in 
response to the news from the financial officer as 
to margins.  In short, a cost-plus pricing system 
would assist librarians in smoking out those 
dealers with a penchant for playing fast and 
loose with prices and discounting.  Thus, cost-
plus pricing placed in the hands of librarians a 
superior means to monitor the most effective 
management of their materials budgets.
Almost immediately upon the launch of the 
cost-plus pricing system, the academic librar-
ians began to complain, some quite vigorously. 
The special librarians in corporate and research 
libraries in contrast really welcomed it.  It seems 
that the latter were both accustomed to such 
systems, as so many corporate and laboratory 
organizations fairly routinely employed such 
arrangements in their purchasing or supplying 
of services.  Further, they valued the ability to 
manage their library materials budget, for that 
is the environment in which they operated.  The 
reasons behind the near-universal and visceral 
academic library dislike of the system puzzles 
me.  I still have no satisfying explanation therefor 
even today.
When the North American office managers 
met shortly after the introduction of the cost-plus 
discounting system, they were opposed to it to 
a man and strongly urged a hasty return to the 
traditional pricing method.  So, on the strength 
of these remonstrances we reverted back to the 
old practices.
But with this reversion we were faced with 
the associated return of the unpleasant financial 
facts that had led to the decision to move to a more 
rational and transparent pricing practice.  What 
were we to do?  We had to solve our long-term 
capital requirements.  But we were faced by an 
apparently insoluble competitive predicament. 
We were left to generating some other ethical and 
transparent but rational pricing system to replace 
the traditionally obscure and easily abused system 
which had been the practice from before the time 
the firm had ever become a specialist dealer to 
academic and research libraries.
But other events overtook this effort — we 
were now faced with the sudden onset of the 
sharp recession that began in earnest in mid-1974. 
The firm had successfully weathered a couple 
of earlier recessions and the almost universal 
associated tightening of cash flow.  These earlier 
downturns had created genuine difficulties, but 
we had succeeded in dealing with the accompa-
nying slowdown in cash flow.  But in the 1974 
recession everyone seemed to be hoarding cash. 
The consequence for our firm was that our aver-
age account-receivable (the money owing us for 
books and services delivered on open account) 
moved from the usual 70-75 days from invoice 
date to payment received date to 106 days.  This 
rapid slowing of cash flow occurred in less than 
six months.  So, by the summer of 1974 we had 
reached the 106-day mark.
Now, this length of time, 106 days, was well in 
excess of the more-or-less informal 90-day terms 
allowed library booksellers by most publishers 
who well understood the realities of institutional 
accounting.  But another financial exigency ap-
peared.  To provide the working capital needed 
to operate the firm, we borrowed from a local 
bank.  Our terms with the bank were that we 
would pay several points over prime.  (Banks 
do not feel comfortable with financing things so 
seldom in demand as books and so vaporous as 
Approval Plans and book-cataloging.)  The even 
more onerous term in these recessional circum-
stances was that they would finance our accounts 
receivable for only 90 days.  By the summer of 
1974 our interest rate had climbed to 21.5%. 
This percentage was well over our margins, so 
we were losing money on every sale.  And our 
average account receivable was outstanding 106 
days, so we possessed inadequate working capital 
to sustain our operations.  We were operating at 
about $4 million of purchases a month at this 
point, so obviously we needed an injection of cash 
in the amount of roughly $2 million.  We were 
not going to long survive in these circumstances 
absent additional working capital.
I brought aboard Fred Meikle, who had 
distinguished himself as a business consultant 
and a proved manager in difficult settings, to run 
the operation while I sought to raise capital.  The 
latter demanded extended trips and stays in the 
principal money markets of the U.S.
My first assay was in New York City to the 
underwriter which had agreed to take the firm 
public — and whose man in charge of putting 
together such flotations had assured me at the time 
of signing with them that his firm always stood 
by clients when they experienced hard times. 
After several weeks, as they considered what to 
do, I was called to learn that if they supplied the 
cash we needed they would lose money on the 
securities they would have to sell to do so.  This 
became an all too common recital — the front 
office seeming to be interested in and prepared 
to work with us only to be told after many sub-
missions of data and projections followed by 
conversations that the back office had rejected 
any help.  So, we were faced with discovering 
and pursuing other avenues of financing to tide 
us over this recessional period and to the time 
when receipts against receivables had returned 
to their normal cycle.
Lyman Newlin was a daily companion in 
these pursuits as I was virtually living in New 
York City, and the city was his stomping ground. 
We, together with Keith Barker by phone, finally 
concluded that our best shot was to try to sell an 
interest in the firm rather than continue to seek a 
loan of some kind.  To this end we went to some 
old friends now retired from various publishing 
houses gathered together by Cameron Moseley 
(Mose) and known as Moseley Associates. 
Moseley Associates were then the leading pub-
lishing consultants and were involved in a variety 
of deals in the book trade.  We also turned to 
Daniel Melcher, who had retired after selling the 
Bowker Company.  Some unlikely help turned 
up from several of the immigrant publishers 
from Germany and Austria, who had founded 
outstanding publishing firms in the United States 
— most especially Walter Johnson.  They too 
had lived through hard times and by virtue of long 
associations in the international trade recognized 
the commitment of the Argonauts to the book and 
to the brokering of knowledge world-wide and 
of the value and contribution of the firm to the 
international scholarly book trade.
These several generous supporters pointed 
to or introduced us to prospective backers not 
only in and around New York City but in Bos-
ton, Chicago, and elsewhere as well.  As these 
prospects were suggested I traveled to meet 
with them to make our case.  Several expressed 
a genuine interest but as was becoming an almost 
universal response, they concluded that the losses 
they would suffer in selling financial assets in a 
depressed financial market to raise the amount we 
needed might well not repay them for the risk they 
would sustain by investing in the firm.
In the course of these various conversations I 
picked up the rumor on several occasions that the 
Blackwell family was tentatively seeking to gain 
a footing in North America.  So, in the spirit of 
leaving no stone unturned I called the Blackwell 
offices in Oxford.  I was put through to Miles, 
the son of Richard Blackwell, who was then the 
CEO of the firm.  Miles was the chief factotum 
of the library supply division of the firm.  Our 
conversation was cordial, and Miles seemed 
encouraging.  Within a week or two Miles called 
back to advise that he, his father, and the CEO of 
Blackwell Scientific, Per Saugman would like 
to come to Portland to talk with us.  Arrangements 
were made, and the meeting was soon arranged. 
To make a long story short multiple trips by both 
organizations between Portland and Oxford were 
made — complicated by the Christmas and New 
Year holidays.  A solution to our problems seemed 
to be close to realization.
At the end of the day, however, it became clear 
that the Blackwells had settled on a strategy of 
letting our firm go into involuntary bankruptcy 
at the hands of the bank.  After the bank had 
auctioned off those assets which Blackwell did 
not want, Blackwell would buy from the bank, 
for the balance on the bank’s loan to our former 
firm, those assets which they wanted — the 
integrated Approval Plan software, standing 
order, and cataloging software; the bibliographic 
and cataloging databases; office and warehouse 
furnishings, etc.
Some of the managers seeing the handwrit-
ing on the wall sensibly spun off into separate 
businesses doing the same thing.  The largest of 
these in the United States was Academic Book-
sellers.  Tom Slatner started a United Kingdom 
firm under his name to deal with the former UK 
libraries.  Bernhard Starkmann started a Dutch 
firm under his name to deal with the former Con-
tinental libraries.  Both of the latter opened U.S. 
buying offices to supply their libraries with their 
North American titles. Starkmann ultimately 
bought Slatner out and removed his company 
to London from Amsterdam.
And so the Band of Argonauts went their vari-
ous ways, some in company with others of the 
Band, the remainder as single, venturer bookmen. 
It is hard for me to imagine anyone ever again 
assembling such a formidable and competent 
band of knowledge brokers.  
Papa Abel Remembers
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